In 2016, the state of Israel established timeframes for processing complaints of suspected violation of the laws of armed conflict for the very first time. Both commissions that addressed this matter, the Ciechanover Commission and the Turkel Commission, determined that the Military Advocate General’s Corps must decide whether or not to launch a criminal investigation within 14 weeks at most; in cases when a criminal investigation is launched, it must be concluded within 9 months, and in severe cases within one year; and that making a decision whether to serve indictments must not exceed 9 months, and one year in exceptional cases.

A decade later, this data sheet examines whether these timeframes are applied in practice by examining how long it takes the military law enforcement system to process complaints concerning offenses perpetrated by Israeli soldiers committed against Palestinians and their property in the West Bank in 2016-2025. The data presented here is based on legal representation provided to Palestinian residents of the West Bank harmed by Israeli soldiers during this period.

Examining how long it takes to process complaints may seem trivial, and it certainly pales in comparison with the killing of dozens of thousands of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the results of rampant settler violence in the West Bank. Yet timeframes for handling complaints are crucial when considering how seriously and effectively allegations of harm to Palestinians are treated. The prolonged processing of complaints is one of the central factors underlying the extremely low rate of indictments in complaints submitted by Palestinians regarding harm caused by Israeli soldiers: between 2016 and 2024, 2,427 complaints were brought to the attention of the military; 552 criminal investigations were opened (22.7% of the complaints); and just 23 indictments were served (0.9% of the complaints).

Data collected over a decade of monitoring the army’s processing of Palestinians’ complaints reflect that the army is unable to comply with the timeframes set according to its own suggestions:

  •  on average, it took 213 days to decide whether or not to launch a criminal investigation, approximately 7 months, over twice the permitted time;
  •  in cases involving fatalities where investigations were not immediately launched, it took 304 days on average, approximately 10 months, to decide whether or not to launch an investigation;
  •  processing of nearly half the complaints (approx. 45%) took 2-5 years.

The bottleneck occurs mainly within the Military Advocate General’s Corps: particularly before making the decision whether or not to launch a criminal investigation, and to a lesser extent, once the MPCID investigation is concluded and the case is referred back to a prosecutor for a decision to be made whether to file an indictment or close the investigation file. The long wait until a criminal investigation is launched and again until a decision is made following it thwarts the investigations in practice, precluding any possibility that the military law enforcement system will penalize offenders and handle suspected violations of the laws of armed conflict.

By refraining from treating complaints submitted to it promptly, effectively and with due gravitas, the Military Advocate General’s Corps sends a clear message to soldiers that the army condones violence, looting property, beating, wounding or even killing Palestinians in the West Bank. The continuous permission granted to soldiers to operate unconstrained vis-a-vis the Palestinian population in the West Bank has turned violence, cruelty and degradation into measures exercised by commanders in the field, enabling them to operate more easily.

The army’s intentional delays in handling Palestinians’ complaints serves two purposes: domestically, it helps the State of Israel provide immunity to soldiers from prosecution and enables the army to carry out a policy of control over the Palestinians without the burdensome limitations of the rule of law; and internationally, it creates a semblance of law enforcement and the appearance of a functioning mechanism, hindering international interference. By evading its duty to treat cases that violate the laws of armed conflict with due gravitas, as reflected in this data sheet, Israel undermines this semblance of law enforcement and opens the door to international involvement.